EDF v EPA (PCB case)
EDF vs. EPA
(The "PCB Case")
For use in ENVL417-Environmental Law
Markups and annotations added
All other users refer to original source at:: 636 F.2D 1267, 205 U.S.APP.D.C. 139
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC., Petitioner,
v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Respondent,
Ad Hoc Committee on Liquid Dielectrics of the Electronic Industries Association
et al., Joy Manufacturing Company, Edison Electric Institute et al., and
Aluminum Company of America, Intervenors.
Nos. 79-1580, 79-1811 and 79-1816.
United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued June 6, 1980.
Decided Oct. 30, 1980.
A review regulations of
promulgated by the Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection
Agency. The Court of Appeals held that:
(1) no
substantial evidence supported the administrative determination to classify
certain polychlorinated biphenyl uses as "totally enclosed" and therefore
exempt;
(2) no substantial evidence supported the administrative decision to
exclude from regulation all materials containing concentrations of PCBs below
50 ppm;
(3) substantial evidence supported the administrative determination
to allow continued use of eleven nontotally enclosed uses.
EDWARDS, Circuit Judge:
In this case the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) petitions for review of
regulations, issued by the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), that
implement section 6(e) of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).(FOOTNOTE 1 ) That
section of the Act provides broad rules governing the disposal, marking,
manufacture, processing, distribution, and use of a class of chemicals called
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs).(FOOTNOTE 2)
EDF seeks review of three aspects of the regulations.(FOOTNOTE 3) First, it
challenges the determination by EPA that certain commercial uses of PCBs are
"totally enclosed," a designation that exempts those uses from regulation under
the Act. Second, it claims that the EPA acted contrary to law when it limited
the applicability of the regulations to materials containing concentrations of
PCBs greater than fifty parts per million (ppm). Third, EDF challenges the
decision by EPA to authorize the continued use of eleven non-totally enclosed
uses of PCBs.
Footnote 3. EDF challenges the regulations, promulgated under s 6(e)(2) and (3)
of the Act, 15 U.S.C. s 2605(e)(2) & (3) (1976), governing the
manufacture, processing, distribution, and use of PCBs the so-called Ban
Regulations. See 44 Fed.Reg. 31,542-58 (1979) (to be codified in 40
C.F.R. pt. 761). EDF does not challenge the Disposal Regulations, issued
pursuant to s 6(e)(1) of the Act. EPA issued the final Disposal
Regulations over a year before the Ban Regulations. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 761
(1978), 43 Fed.Reg. 7,156-64 (1978). EPA later reissued the Disposal
Regulations with slight modification along with the final Ban Regulations.
See 44 Fed.Reg. 31,542-58 (1979).
From our examination of the record, we find that there is no substantial
evidence to support the EPA determination to classify certain PCB uses as
"totally enclosed." We also find that there is no substantial
evidence in the record to support the EPA decision to exclude from regulation
all materials containing concentrations of PCBs below fifty ppm. Accordingly,
on these first two points, we hold unlawful and set aside the challenged
regulations, and remand to EPA for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
We find, however, that there is substantial evidence in the record to support
the EPA determination to allow continued use of the eleven non-totally enclosed
uses. Accordingly, on this third point, we uphold the EPA regulations.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Polychlorinated Biphenyls
Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) have been manufactured and used commercially
for fifty years for their chemical stability, fire resistance, and electrical
resistance properties. They are frequently used in electrical transformers and
capacitors. However, PCBs are extremely toxic to humans and wildlife. The
extent of their toxicity is made clear in the EPA Support Document (FOOTNOTE 4)
accompanying the final regulations, in which the EPA Office of Toxic Substances
identified several adverse effects resulting from human and wildlife exposure
to PCBs.
Epidemiological data and experiments on laboratory animals indicate that
exposure to PCBs pose carcinogenic and other risks to humans. Experimental
animals developed tumors after eating diets that included concentrations of
PCBs as low as 100 parts per million (ppm). Experiments on monkeys indicate
that diets with PCB concentrations of less than ten ppm reduce fertility and
cause still births and birth defects. Other data show that PCBs may adversely
affect enzyme production, thereby interfering with the treatment of diseases in
humans. Support Document, supra note 4, at 9-18.
EPA has found that PCBs will adversely affect wildlife as well as humans.
Concentrations below one ppb (part per billion) are believed to impair
reproductivity of aquatic invertebrates and fish. Some birds suffered "severe
reproductive failure" when fed diets containing concentrations of only ten ppm
of PCBs. Id. at 19. Because PCBs collect in waterways and bioaccumulate in
fish,(FOOTNOTE 5) fish-eating mammals run a special risk of adverse effects. Such
mammals may have "significantly higher concentrations of PCBs in their tissues
than the aquatic forms they feed on." Id. at 36.
Footnote 5. One typical study reported that fathead minnows bioconcentrated PCBs
by a factor of 230,000. Support Document, supra note 4, at 35.
EPA estimates that by 1975 up to 400 million pounds of PCBs had entered the
environment. Approximately twenty-five to thirty percent of this amount is
considered "free," meaning that it is a direct source of contamination for
wildlife and humans. The rest, "mostly in the form of industrial waste and
discarded end use products, is believed to be in landfill sites and thus
constitutes a potential source of new free PCBs." Id. at 33-34.(FOOTNOTE 6) Other
significant sources of PCBs include atmospheric fallout and spills associated
with the use or transportation of PCBs. Id. at 29.
Footnote 6. However, the average non-landfill concentration of PCBs is below the
level of detection. Id. at 34. One study indicated that only 0.1 percent
of the soil samples analyzed had detectable levels of PCBs. Id.
EPA concluded in the Support Document that "the additional release of PCBs"
into the environment would result in widespread distribution of the PCBs and
"will eventually expose large populations of wildlife and man to PCBs." Id. at
36-37. EPA concluded further that:
As a practical matter, it is not possible to determine a "safe" level of
exposure to these chemicals. Because PCBs are already widely distributed
throughout the biosphere, they currently pose a significant
risk to the health of man as well as that of numerous other living things. As
a consequence, any further increase in levels of PCBs in the biosphere is
deemed undesirable by EPA.
Id. at 38. Because "PCBs released anywhere into the environment will
eventually enter the biosphere ... EPA has determined that any such release of
PCBs must be considered 'significant.' " Id.
In 1972, Monsanto, the major American manufacturer of PCBs, limited its sales
of PCBs to manufacturers of transformers and capacitors. It ceased all
manufacture of PCBs in 1977 and shipped the last of its inventory before the
end of that year. Today, PCBs are produced in this country only as incidental
byproducts of industrial chemical processes. There are no known natural
sources of PCBs. Id. at 2.
B. Congressional Response
Responding to the dangers associated with the use of PCBs and other
toxic chemicals, Congress in 1976 enacted the Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA), Pub.L.No.94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976). Although the Act is
generally designed to cover the regulation of all chemical substances, section
6(e) refers solely to the disposal, manufacture, processing, distribution, and
use of PCBs. No other section of the Act addresses the regulation of a single
class of chemicals.
The special attention accorded to PCBs in the Toxic Substances Control Act
resulted from the recognized seriousness of the threat that PCBs pose to the
environment and human health. During the debate over the Senate version of the
Act, Senator Nelson, the author of the amendment adding the PCB subsection to
the Senate bill, noted that PCBs were widespread in the environment and that
they posed significant potential dangers to human health and to wildlife.(FOOTNOTE 7)
In the House of Representatives, Congressman Dingell introduced a similar
amendment to the House version of the Toxic Substances Control Act,(FOOTNOTE 8) not
only because PCBs posed great dangers to the natural and human environments,
but also because "the history of EPA is not one of vigorous and quick action."
(FOOTNOTE 9)
Footnote 7. See 122 Cong.Rec. 8291-94 (1976), reprinted in House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Legislative History of the Toxic
Substances Control Act, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 233-40 (1976) (hereinafter
referred to as "Legislative History"). Section 6(e) was added to both the
Senate and House bills during floor debate.
As enacted, section 6(e) of the Act sets forth a detailed scheme to
dispose of PCBs, to phase out the manufacture, processing, and
distribution of PCBs, and to limit the use of PCBs. Specifically, section 6(e)
provides that, within six months of the effective date of the Act (January 1,
1977), EPA must prescribe methods to dispose of PCBs and to require that PCB
containers be marked with appropriate warnings. 15 U.S.C. s 2605(e)(1).
One year after the effective date of the Act, PCBs can be manufactured,
processed, distributed, and used only in a "totally enclosed manner." Id. s
2605(e)(2)(A). One year later, all manufacture of PCBs is prohibited. Id. s
2605(e)(3)(A)(i). Six months after that (i. e. two and one-half years after
the effective date of the Act), all processing and distribution of PCBs in
commerce is prohibited. Id. s 2605(e)(3)(A)(ii). Thus, today, except for the
specified authorizations and exemptions described below, the Act permits PCBs
to be used only in a totally enclosed manner, and it completely prohibits the
manufacture, processing, and distribution of PCBs. . . .
(statutory provisions omitted)
The statute sets forth only limited exceptions to these broad prohibitions.
C. EPA's Implementation of section 6(e)
EPA sought to implement section 6(e) through two sets of regulations. The
first set of regulations the so-called Disposal Regulations set forth specific
rules governing the disposal and marking of PCBs. The Disposal Regulations
covered not only pure PCB compounds, but also materials contaminated with at
least 500 ppm of PCBs. EPA chose this regulatory cutoff in order to regulate
"disposal of most PCB's ... as soon as possible." Preamble to Final
Disposal Regulations, 43 Fed.Reg. 7,151 (1978). EPA warned
that it was considering a new cutoff "possibly in the range of 50 ppm or below"
for the Proposed Ban Regulations. Id.
In June 1978 EPA issued proposed Ban Regulations that would implement the
prohibitions mandated in subsections 6(e)(2) and (3), define "totally enclosed
manner," authorize several non-totally enclosed uses, and set forth the
procedures for obtaining exemptions from the prohibitions. See Proposed Ban
Regulations, 43 Fed.Reg. 24,801 (1978). As foreshadowed in the final
Disposal Regulations, the proposed and final Ban Regulations (issued May 31,
1979) set fifty ppm as the cutoff. See 43 Fed.Reg. 24,813 (1978), 44
Fed.Reg. 31,543 (1979) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. s 761.1(b)). The final
regulations defined all electrical capacitors, electromagnets, and non-railroad
transformers as totally enclosed,(FOOTNOTE 12) thus automatically exempting them from
regulation under the Act. In the final regulations the Administrator
authorized eleven non-totally enclosed uses to continue, including the
servicing of totally enclosed uses,(FOOTNOTE 13) based on his consideration of the
health and environmental effects of PCBs, the exposure to PCBs resulting from
these activities, the availability of substitutes for the PCBs, and the
economic impact of restricting those uses. See Support Document, supra note 4,
at v. Most authorizations continue until July 1, 1984, with some
authorizations expiring sooner. Only the authorization for carbonless copy
paper continues indefinitely.
Footnote12. The complete list of totally enclosed uses is as follows:
distribution and use, except servicing, of intact, non-leaking, non-
railroad PCB transformers, PCB-contaminated transformers (defined to
include transformers with PCB concentrations in the dielectric (or
insulating) fluid of between 50 and 500 ppm), electromagnets, and
capacitors; and processing, distribution in commerce, and use of PCB
equipment containing intact, non-leaking capacitors. See Final Ban
Regulations, 44 Fed.Reg. 31,549 (1979) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. s
761.30).
Footnote 13. The authorizations are: servicing of non-railroad transformers; use
and servicing of railroad transformers; use and servicing of mining
equipment; use in heat transfer systems; use in hydraulic systems; use in
existing stocks of carbonless copy paper; use in pigments; servicing of
electromagnets; use in natural gas pipeline compressors; use in small
quantities for research and development; and use as a microscopy mounting
medium. See id. at 31,549-51 (1979) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. s
761.31). Detailed conditions attach to each of the authorizations.
II. JURISDICTION
At the outset one of the intervenors, Ad Hoc Committee on Liquid
Dielectrics of the Electronic Industries Association (EIA), challenges the
jurisdiction of this court to consider EDF's petition. EIA contends that under
the authority of Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 598 F.2d 62 (D.C.Cir.1978), and subsection 20(a)(2) of TSCA,(FOOTNOTE 14) a
federal district court is the proper forum in the first instance to hear EDF's
claims. Upon considered review of this jurisdictional question, we find EIA's
position to be without merit, and we hold that the matters at issue in this
case are properly before this court for review.
... As explained in the 1978 EDF case, a federal
district court is the appropriate forum whenever a court must gather and
evaluate additional evidence. 598 F.2d at 91. Here no trial is necessary
for there is a complete administrative record for this court to review.
A review of the jurisdictional provisions of the Toxic Substances Control Act
demonstrates that this court, and not the district court, has jurisdiction to
consider EDF's petition.
III. USE AUTHORIZATIONS
A. Criteria for the "Unreasonable Risk" Determination
... Using the criteria set forth in subsection 6(c)(1),(FOOTNOTE 18)
the Administrator found that eleven non-totally enclosed uses did not present
an unreasonable risk. On the basis of these findings, EPA authorized the
continued use of the eleven non-totally enclosed uses here in dispute.(FOOTNOTE 19)
In attacking these use authorizations, EDF claims that the Administrator
employed the wrong criteria in making his determinations concerning
"unreasonable risk." (FOOTNOTE 20) ...
Because there is no
compelling evidence to support the position advanced by EDF, and because of the
deference that we must accord an agency's reasonable interpretation of its
statute, [citations omitted], we
conclude that the statute does not preclude the EPA from using the subsection
6(c)(1) criteria in making the unreasonable risk determinations under
6(e)(2) (B).
Moreover, because the expression "unreasonable risk of injury to health or the
environment" is left undefined in section 6(e), the Administrator was required
to give some meaning to it. Since the 6(c)(1) criteria obviously pertain to
factors of "unreasonable risk," it was entirely appropriate for EPA to consider
such criteria in ascribing a meaning to the use authorization provision in
6(e)(2)(B). EDF has shown nothing to indicate otherwise. In fact, EDF does
not really contest use of the first three criteria in 6(c)(1) i. e. the effects
on health and on the environment, and the availability of substitutes. Rather,
EDF's primary focus is on the fourth criterion in 6(c) (1), relating to the
economic consequences of the authorization. Yet, EDF's objections to the
"economic consequences" criterion cannot stand in the face of section 2(c) of
the Act, which expressly requires the Administrator to consider such factors.
(FOOTNOTE 23)
Furthermore, the particular economic factors that EPA took into account
were plainly reasonable.(FOOTNOTE 24) The Administrator did not
simply propose to consider the effect of the ban on industry, but also the
effects on "the national economy, small business, technological innovation, the
environment, and public health." See note 18, supra. This formulation, which
considers a broad range of benefits and costs of the ban and use authorization,
is entirely consistent with the section 2(c) requirement that the Administrator
consider the economic and social impact on his actions.
Because the 6(c)(1) criteria fulfill an express mandate of the statute and
reflect a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous phrase, we conclude that
the Administrator did not err in choosing those criteria to make the
unreasonable risk determinations under 6(e)(2)(B).(FOOTNOTE 25)
B. Application of the Criteria
EDF's final attack on the use authorizations is that the Administrator did not
properly apply his own criteria in making the unreasonable risk
determinations. Here, too, we reject EDF's position.(FOOTNOTE 26)
Petitioner's reply brief, p. 33 n.1. Because use in microscopy mounting
medium, research and development, and pigments also involves small amounts
of PCBs or short authorization periods, see Preamble to Final Ban
Regulations, 44 Fed.Reg. 31,535-37 (1979), we assume that EDF does not
challenge these authorizations. We note, however, that our review of the
record finds substantial evidence supporting the Administrator's decision
to authorize those uses. As a result, we restrict our discussion in the
text to the servicing of transformers and electromagnets, and the use and
servicing of railroad transformers.
EPA's use authorizations for servicing non-railroad transformers and
electromagnets are predicated in part on its determination that non-
railroad transformers and electromagnets are totally enclosed. See id. at
31,530, 31,536. Because of our disposition of EDF's challenge to the
Administrator's decision finding that these classes of uses are totally
enclosed, see section V, infra, the present discussion applies only to
transformers and electromagnets that are actually totally enclosed.
The standard of judicial review for rules promulgated under section 6(e) is
expressly set forth in subsection 19(c)(1)(B)(i): "the court shall hold
unlawful and set aside such rule if the court finds that the rule is not
supported by substantial evidence in the rulemaking record." 15 U.S.C. s
2618(c)(1)(B)(i). Evidence includes "any matter in the rulemaking record."
Id.
The substantial evidence standard (FOOTNOTE 27) mandated by the Act is
generally considered to be more rigorous than the arbitrary and capricious
standard normally applied to informal rulemaking.(FOOTNOTE 28) Under the substantial
evidence standard, a reviewing court must give careful scrutiny to agency
findings and, at the same time, accord appropriate deference to administrative
decisions that are based on agency experience and expertise. Because
administrative decisions often involve judgments based on
incomplete or even conflicting scientific data, the agency "may have to fill
gaps in knowledge with policy considerations." AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617
F.2d 636, 651 (D.C.Cir.1979). Consequently, reviewing courts "must examine
both factual evidence and the agency's policy considerations set forth in the
record." Id. The court's role in reviewing regulations is to ensure public
accountability "by requiring the agency to identify relevant factual evidence,
to explain the logic and the policies underlying any legislative choice, to
state candidly any assumptions on which it relies, and to present its reasons
for rejecting significant contrary evidence and argument." United Steelworkers
of America v. Marshall, --- F.2d ----, ----, No. 79-1048 (D.C.Cir. Aug. 15,
1980). With these general guidelines in mind, we review EPA's PCB use
authorizations. ...
In an attempt to reduce the costs of compliance and the risks associated with
exposure to PCBs, the Administrator created two categories for transformers
PCB-contaminated transformers (containing PCB concentrations between fifty and
500 ppm) and PCB transformers (containing PCB concentrations greater than 500
ppm).
Because the Administrator found that proper protective clothing and good
management practices should reduce PCB exposure to "very low levels," the
regulations permit routine servicing of PCB transformers and electromagnets.
Preamble to Final Ban Regulations, 44 Fed.Reg. 31,531 (1979).(FOOTNOTE 29)
Additionally, the Administrator heard uncontradicted evidence that a
prohibition of routine servicing would significantly increase the chances of
catastrophic transformer failure, presenting "far greater risks to health and
the environment than that associated with the minimal PCB exposure during
routine servicing." Id. However, the Administrator found that the rebuilding
of PCB transformers and electromagnets (i. e. non-routine servicing) risks
greater exposure to PCBs due to leaks, spillage, or volatilization of the
dielectric. The Administrator also found that a prohibition against "any
servicing (including rebuilding) of PCB Transformers that involves removing the
coils from the casing ... will cost about $12 million the first year and
steadily less each year thereafter." Id. Applying these findings to the
6(c) (1) criteria, the Administrator ruled that continued routine servicing,
without rebuilding, and not involving the removal of coils, would present no
unreasonable risk of injury.(FOOTNOTE 30) The uncontradicted evidence and the
explication of policy considerations in the present record is sufficient to
uphold the use authorization for routine servicing of PCB transformers and
electromagnets.
...
Because they contain lower concentrations of PCBs, PCB-contaminated
transformers present correspondingly smaller risks associated with exposure.
Accordingly, the Administrator found that routine servicing of PCB-contaminated
transformers presents no unreasonable risk of injury. Furthermore, because
ninety-nine percent of all large transformers are PCB-contaminated
transformers, a prohibition on rebuilding could cause "extremely high" costs.
Id. Balancing these factors, the Administrator concluded that there was no
unreasonable risk associated with the rebuilding or other
extensive servicing of PCB-contaminated transformers.
Through these two classifications the Administrator has sought to
encourage users to convert to PCB-contaminated transformers by draining their
PCB transformers and refilling them with some other dielectric fluid. Only
after converting the transformers can users rebuild their transformers, thereby
reducing operating costs. Thus, the Administrator has created an incentive to
dispose of PCBs without imposing extraordinary costs on industry. These policy
considerations and findings reflect the criteria outlined in subsection
6(c) (1). Because the Administrator has carefully articulated his policy
judgments, and because there is substantial evidence in the record to support
his findings, we uphold the use authorization for PCB-contaminated
transformers.
The Administrator's authorization of the use and servicing of railroad
transformers also reflects a proper balancing of the subsection 6(c)(1)
criteria. Because of the strenuous conditions under which they operate,
railroad transformers often leak PCBs onto railroad beds,(FOOTNOTE 31) risking
exposure to the environment and to workers and other persons near rail lines.
On the other hand, nearly 1,000 of these transformers are currently used in
railroad engines. A flat prohibition of their use would produce "an
unacceptably severe curtailment of railroad service." Id. at 31,532.
In order to balance the social and economic impact of a prohibition against
the risks to health and the environment, the Administrator sought a solution
that would permit continued use while promoting conversion to non-PCB
dielectric fluid. In reaching his solution, the Administrator considered the
ninety million dollars in costs associated with immediate conversion to non-PCB
dielectrics and the undermined safety risks associated with fire and explosion
in using non-PCB dielectrics. Consequently, EPA issued regulations requiring
railroads to reduce the concentration of PCBs in railroad transformers to six
percent (60,000 ppm) by 1982, and to 1,000 ppm by 1984. This timetable, EPA
believes, will give it sufficient time to evaluate the risks associated with
use of non-PCB fluids, and will also substantially reduce the costs of
compliance. Id. at 31,533.
It is clear that the Administrator has properly applied the 6(c)(1) criteria
in making the unreasonable risk determinations. Where scientific knowledge is
incomplete, EPA has set forth specific policy considerations explaining the
final regulations. Finding substantial evidence in the record to support the
Administrator's findings, we uphold the authorizations for railroad
transformers.(FOOTNOTE 32)
IV. THE FIFTY PPM REGULATORY CUTOFF
As a part of the regulatory scheme for PCBs under section 6(e), EPA
limited application of the Disposal and Ban Regulations to
materials containing concentrations of at least fifty ppm of PCBs. With one
exception,(FOOTNOTE 33) materials with lower concentrations remain unregulated under
the TSCA regulations.(FOOTNOTE 34) EDF contends that this limitation contravenes the
statutory command in subsections 6(e)(2)(A) and 6(e)(3)(A) to regulate "any
polychlorinated biphenyl." While we do not adopt all of EDF's reasoning, we
find that, under the applicable standard for judicial review,(FOOTNOTE 35) there is no
substantial evidence in the record to support the Administrator's decision to
establish a regulatory cutoff at fifty ppm.
Throughout the rulemaking proceedings for both the Disposal and Ban
Regulations, EPA assumed that it would adopt some sort of regulatory cutoff.
In the Disposal Regulations, EPA set the cutoff at 500 ppm, not because of
health and environmental considerations, but in order to choose "a level at
which regulated disposal of most PCB's can be implemented as soon as
possible." Preamble to Final Disposal Regulations, 43 Fed.Reg. 7,151
(1978). EPA was reluctant to impose a lower cutoff since, from available
information, the agency could not determine the "regulatory impact on
commercial products" for lower levels. Subsequent to those proceedings,
however, the agency acquired evidence that led it to believe that the "impact
on commercial products of defining lower levels of contamination as 'PCB
Mixtures' appears less than first believed .... (As a result), the Agency plans
to propose a lower concentration of PCB's, possibly in the range of 50 ppm or
below, to define PCB mixture in the forthcoming" Ban Regulations. Id.
In the Proposed Ban Regulations, EPA listed four reasons for setting the
regulatory cutoff at fifty ppm. First, EPA believed that a fifty ppm limit
would "exclude from the rule municipal sludges and other mixtures containing
low (less than 50 ppm) levels of PCB's whose presence is due to ambient levels
of PCB present in the air or water." Preamble to Proposed Ban Regulations,
43 Fed.Reg. 24,804 (1978). As EPA develops in its brief, Congress did not
design section 6(e) to regulate ambient sources of PCBs. Second, EPA believed
that some industrial chemical processes inevitably produce traces of PCBs, and
that careful controls could reduce the concentrations of PCBs only to fifty
ppm. Third, EPA felt that it was impractical to regulate the "diffuse and
extremely numerous PCB sources" with concentrations below fifty ppm. Id. EPA
believed that the proposed cutoff would ensure maximum effectiveness of the
regulation by focusing "Agency attention under TSCA upon the most significant
and controllable sources of PCB exposure." Id. Fourth, the agency believed
that other statutes were available to regulate low concentrations of PCBs,
particularly municipal sludges and dredge soils.
In the Final Ban Regulations, EPA adopted the proposed fifty ppm regulatory
cutoff. Although industry favored a cutoff of 500 ppm in order to reduce the
costs of complying with the regulations, EPA found that industry could comply
with the more stringent standard. See Preamble to Final Ban Regulations, 44
Fed.Reg. 31,516 (1979). Furthermore, lowering the cutoff from 500 to fifty ppm
would "result in substantially increased health and environmental protection."
Id.
A cutoff below fifty ppm, on the other hand, would "provide an additional
degree of environmental protection but would have a grossly disproportionate
effect on the economic impact and would have a serious technological impact on
the organic chemicals industry." Id. While it did not have firm data, EPA
believed that for some chemical processes, it was technically
impossible to eliminate the inadvertent production of PCBs. EPA also feared
that because of limited disposal facilities, a lower cutoff would increase
disposal requirements and interfere with the disposal of high concentration
wastes. In short, EPA believed that the fifty ppm cutoff "provides adequate
protection for human health and the environment while defining a program that
EPA can effectively implement." Id. (FOOTNOTE 36)
Both EPA and EDF claim that the statutory language and legislative history
support their positions on the regulatory cutoff. The statutory language is
simple: "no person may ... use any polychlorinated biphenyl in any manner other
than in a totally enclosed manner." 15 U.S.C. s 2605(e)(2)(A). Similarly,
the prohibitions on manufacture, processing, and distribution refer to "any
polychlorinated biphenyl." See id. s 2605(e)(3)(A). Taken literally, this
language might require EPA to regulate every molecule of PCB. We are
reluctant, however, to impose such an extreme interpretation absent support in
the legislative history.
The legislative history reveals that Congress was aware of existing
environmental contamination by PCBs the so-called ambient sources of
contamination. For example, during the Senate debate of the amendment adding
section 6(e) to the TSCA bill, Senator Nelson, who introduced the amendment,
read into the record reports showing the widespread environmental contamination
by PCBs. ... EPA concluded, we believe correctly, that despite Congress' recognition that
existing contamination of PCBs in the environment posed continuing risks to
humans and wildlife, Congress did not design section 6(e) to regulate ambient
sources of PCBs. Congressman Gude, who co-authored section 6(e), argued that
it "will speedily eliminate the introduction of additional PCB's into the
environment." Id. at 27186, reprinted in Legislative History, supra note 7, at
585 (emphasis added). Congressman Leggett noted that "PCB's cannot be removed
from the environment" and that even if "PCB's were eliminated now," waterways
will remain contaminated for years. Id. at 27187, reprinted in Legislative
History, supra note 7, at 588. From these statements we conclude that section
6(e) was intended to regulate point sources of contamination. (FOOTNOTE 37)
FN37. From the sparse legislative history of s 6(e), it also appears that
Congress focused its attention on the deliberate use, manufacture, and
distribution of PCBs. Throughout the congressional debate, members of
Congress referred to Monsanto Company as the sole producer of PCBs. See
122 Cong.Rec. 8294 (1976), reprinted in Legislative History, supra note
7, at 240 (Senator Tunney, speaking in support of the section, referred to
Monsanto as the "sole domestic manufacturer of PCB's"); id. at 27187,
reprinted in Legislative History, supra note 7, at 588 (Congressman
Leggett, speaking in support of the corresponding section in the House
bill, referred to Monsanto as "the only American manufacturer of PCB's").
Because Congress may not have been aware that other manufacturers produce
PCBs as an incidental by-product of their manufacturing processes, it is
possible that Congress did not intend to regulate the incidental
manufacture of PCBs.
However, given Congress' deep concern with the dangers associated with
PCBs, prompting it to include a special section governing PCBs in an
otherwise general act, we cannot find that Congress intended to exclude
incidentally manufactured PCBs from the Act. Congress' express concern
with widespread contamination and worker exposure, the chemical's toxicity
at extremely low levels, and the statutory language of "any polychlorinated
biphenyl in any manner" lead us to conclude that Congress intended to
include all commercial sources within the EPA regulations. As EPA noted in
the Preamble to the final Ban Regulations:
the prohibition applies to the manufacture of any substance or mixture that
contains PCB at 50 ppm or greater, including PCB that is an intermediate
or "impurity" or "by-product" .... While the production of PCBs under such
circumstances may not be intentional and may have no independent commercial
value, section 6(e) of TSCA applies to any production of PCBs.
Preamble to Final Ban Regulations, 44 Fed.Reg. 31,527 (1979) (emphasis
in original). Because it is reasonable, we defer to this construction of
the statute by EPA. See Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. Int'l Union of Elec.,
Radio and Machine Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961).
Partly in order to incorporate congressional intent,
the Administrator chose a regulatory cutoff at a level that he felt would
exclude the ambient sources from regulation.(FOOTNOTE 38) We are troubled by this
regulation, however, since the purpose of section 6(e) is to prevent the
"introduction of additional PCB's into the environment." The selection of a
cutoff undermines the congressional intent to regulate non-ambient sources of
PCBs if non-ambient sources of contamination remain unregulated. It is equally
troubling that the Administrator apparently is not aware of the amount of PCBs
excluded from regulation by the fifty ppm or other possible cutoffs.
Particularly because the Administrator has found that any exposure to PCBs may
have adverse effects, (FOOTNOTE 39) the Administrator's flat exclusion of some
industrial sources of contamination must undergo careful scrutiny.(FOOTNOTE 40) While
some cutoff may be appropriate, we note that the Administrator did not explain
why the regulation could not be designed expressly to exclude ambient sources,
thus directly fulfilling congressional intent, rather than achieve that goal
indirectly with a cutoff, thereby partly contravening congressional intent.
(FOOTNOTE 41) Thus, a desire to exclude ambient sources of contamination, without
more, cannot support the regulatory cutoff.
EPA also seeks to justify the regulatory cutoff on the basis of the serious
impact a lower cutoff would have on industries that inadvertently produce PCBs
during the manufacturing process. See Preamble to Final Ban Regulations, 44
Fed.Reg. 31,516 (1979). As EPA readily concedes, however, the inadvertent
commercial production of PCBs is to be regulated under the Act. See note 37,
supra. By providing a blanket exemption for concentrations below fifty ppm,
the Administrator has circumvented the authorizations and exemptions
requirements provided in the statute. EPA made no finding that the cutoff
would involve no unreasonable risk to health or the environment.(FOOTNOTE 42) As the
EPA noted in its Support Document for the final Ban
Regulations, justifying a fifty rather than a 500 ppm cutoff, "the
authorization and exemption processes are the most effective way to deal with
any difficulties. The authorization and exemption processes allow the Agency
to tailor the compliance requirements and to be informed as to which companies
are having problems and how they are disposing of their waste streams."
Support Document, supra note 4, at 93-94. We agree with EPA. Consequently, the
burdens faced by industries cannot be the basis for the fifty ppm cutoff.(FOOTNOTE 43)
One of the intervenors, Edison Electric Institute (EEI), and EPA have
attempted to justify the fifty ppm cutoff as an administratively created
exemption to the Act.(FOOTNOTE 44) See Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323,
No. 78-1006 (D.C.Cir. Dec. 14, 1979). Under the heading of "administrative
necessity," this court has recognized that an agency may depart from the
requirements of a regulatory statute. See id. at 357-360 (opinion for the
court by Leventhal, J.). While the court in Alabama Power emphasized that
"(c)ategorical exemptions from the clear commands of a regulatory statute,
though sometimes permitted, are not favored," id. at 358-360, it also noted
that there is "substantive authority (for an agency) to take appropriate action
to cope with the administrative impossibility of applying the commands of the
substantive statute." Id. at 358-359. However, "(t)he agency's burden of
justification in such a case is especially heavy." Id. at 359.
Considerations such as the availability of enforcement resources are
relevant to the administrative necessity exemption. It appears, however, that
EPA is not even aware of the amount of PCBs left unregulated by the cutoff.
Having made no showing that it cannot carry out the statutory commands for
concentrations of PCBs below fifty ppm, EPA fails to meet its heavy burden.
Thus, administrative need, on this record, provides no basis for the fifty ppm
cutoff.
EEI also seeks to justify the regulatory cutoff under a second
principle, the "de minimis " exception to statutory commands. In Alabama
Power, this court found that an agency has the power, "inherent in most
statutory schemes, to overlook circumstances that in context may fairly be
considered de minimis." Id. at 360. That power "is not an ability to
depart from the statute, but rather a tool to be used in implementing the
legislative design." Id. at 360. As the Alabama Power court emphasized, de
minimis authority may be available "when the burdens of regulation yield a gain
of trivial or no value." Id. It is not sufficient that the agency may believe
that the costs outweigh the benefits, for Congress has already made the
judgment that the benefits of regulation are sufficient.
The record in the present case is replete with findings and data that
PCBs are toxic to wildlife in concentrations well below fifty ppm.
Furthermore, the record shows that PCBs bioaccumulate in animals, concentrating
as they move up the foodchain. Most importantly, EPA expressly found that any
exposure of PCBs to the environment or humans could cause
adverse effects. These findings leave us unable to say that the Administrator
could rationally conclude that the benefits of regulating concentrations below
fifty ppm are of no value.(FOOTNOTE 45) Consequently, we conclude that the de minimis
exception to the Act is not available to justify the fifty ppm cutoff.(FOOTNOTE 46)
We reemphasize that the Administrator has other, more appropriate means
providing him with flexibility to avoid disproportionate impacts on industries
or on health and the environment. Those tools are the authorization and
exemption provisions in subsections 6(e)(2)(B) and 6(e)(3)(B). The standards
enunciated therein, requiring findings of no "unreasonable risk of injury to
health and the environment" and, in the case of exemptions, good faith efforts
to find substitutes, reflect a plain congressional intention that cannot be
ignored. For if there is an unreasonable risk of injury, as there may be given
EPA's findings, surely Congress did not intend to permit the continued use,
manufacture, processing or distribution of PCBs in concentrations below fifty
ppm. EPA's ad hoc consideration of economic impact and disposal requirements,
leading to a conclusion that the fifty ppm cutoff "provides adequate protection
for human health and the environment," Preamble to Final Ban Regulations, 44
Fed.Reg. 31,516 (1979), is neither as rigorous nor as strict as the statutorily
required unreasonable risk determination based on the subsection 6(c)(1)
criteria.(FOOTNOTE 47) Thus, we remand this part of the record to EPA for further
proceedings.
V. TOTALLY ENCLOSED USES
EDF also petitions for review of the Administrator's decision to list
several uses, including non-railroad transformers, capacitors, and
electromagnets, (FOOTNOTE 48) as totally enclosed uses and therefore exempt from the
regulations promulgated under section 6(e). Because we find no substantial
evidence in the record to support the Administrator's classifications, we
remand this part of the record for further proceedings....
... First,
Congress left to the Administrator the task of deciding which uses were to be
deemed totally enclosed. The statute delegates to the Administrator the duty
of ensuring that human and environmental exposure is "insignificant," a word
that he must define. Second, given Congress' enactment of a special section
for regulating PCBs, we cannot believe that Congress meant to leave unregulated
leaking transformers, capacitors, and electromagnets. Congress could not have
intended to designate, whether explicitly or implicitly, all transformers,
capacitors, and electromagnets as totally enclosed. Third, references in the
congressional debates to "closed uses," do not necessarily refer to "totally
enclosed" uses. Put simply, closed systems develop leaks.(FOOTNOTE 52)
Footnote 52. No doubt transformers, capacitors, and electromagnets are "closed
uses." Otherwise, the liquid PCBs would spill out. The problem is
identifying those that leak, whether due to design defect, accident, or
some other cause. Senator Nelson emphasized this point when, after
discussing "closed" and "non-enclosed" uses, he separately defined "totally
enclosed manner" as ensuring that " 'any leakage of a PCB from its
enclosure will be insignificant.' " 122 Cong.Rec. 8292 (1976), reprinted
in Legislative History, supra note 7, at 234.
EPA argues briefly that the record contains substantial
evidence supporting the agency's classification of transformers, capacitors,
and electromagnets as totally enclosed. In fact, there is no substantial
evidence. To begin with, we have found no evidence in the record discussing
the probabilities or magnitudes of leaks from capacitors. This plainly does
not amount to substantial evidence. As such, capacitors cannot be classified
as totally enclosed uses.
Furthermore, EPA points to no evidence describing electromagnets as totally
enclosed. The only evidence in the record that we have found is one statement
by Commonwealth Edison Co. that they had one electromagnet, and that during
normal operation there is no exposure to humans or the environment. See J.A.
tab Y. From this statement, it is not clear what constitutes "normal
operation." Perhaps leakage occurs during abnormal operation or through human
error. Perhaps abnormal operations occur frequently. We cannot know the
answers to these and other questions, for EPA failed to collect evidence on
them. Furthermore, this sort of evidence, regarding a single electromagnet
especially in light of the severe consequences associated with even small leaks
cannot constitute substantial evidence that electromagnets are totally
enclosed.
Finally, the EPA's evidence that transformers do not leak comprises three
general statements by industry representatives to the effect that totally
enclosed containers do not leak. One commentator from the Nebraska Power
Industry Committee stated that use of transformers "generally involves no
release of PCBs." J.A. tab O. This statement does not amount to substantial
evidence that the regulations "ensure" that there is no exposure. Furthermore,
there is evidence in the record directly contradicting the industry's
statements. One commentator stated that transformers "occasionally blow up and
occasionally are mishandled." J.A. tab S. Another commentator, from the
Michigan Department of Natural Resources, testified that "we recognized that
environmental losses can occur through accidental rupture or leakage." J.A.
tab L. He concluded that "we still believe that a high risk of exposure and
environmental losses likely exist in such facilities." Id.
In light of the record in this case, we find that there is no substantial
evidence that the regulations concerning totally enclosed uses "will ensure
that any exposure of human beings or the environment to a polychlorinated
biphenyl will be insignificant." 15 U.S.C. s 2605(e)(2)(C) (emphasis
added). This lack of substantial evidence calls into question EPA's implicit
finding that it can designate entire classes of uses, rather than individual
containers, as totally enclosed. Of course, we are not directing EPA to apply
the "totally enclosed" proviso on a more individualized basis. On the present
record, however, EPA's findings as to which PCB uses may be classified as
totally enclosed cannot stand. Accordingly, we remand the record to the EPA
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
VI. CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, we find that there is substantial evidence in
the record to support the use authorizations; therefore, we uphold those
regulations. However, because we find no substantial evidence in the record to
support either the fifty ppm cutoff or the EPA classification of certain PCB
uses as totally enclosed, these latter two regulations cannot be upheld.
Consequently, we set aside the regulations dealing with the fifty ppm cutoff
and the classification of certain PCB uses as totally enclosed, and remand
those portions of the record for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
[my favorite part!]
We feel constrained to add one final note to emphasize our concern in this
case. Human beings have finally come to recognize that they must eliminate or
control life threatening chemicals, such as PCBs, if the miracle of life is to
continue and if earth is to remain a living planet. This is precisely what
Congress sought to do when it enacted section 6(e) of the Toxic Substances
Control Act. Yet, we find that forty-six months after the
effective date of an act designed to either totally ban or closely control the
use of PCBs, 99% of the PCBs that were in use when the Act was passed are still
in use in the United States.(FOOTNOTE 53) With information such as this in hand,
timid souls have good reason to question the prospects for our continued
survival, and cynics have just cause to sneer at the effectiveness of
governmental regulation.
The EPA regulations can hardly be viewed as a bold step forward in the battle
against life threatening chemicals. There is no substantial evidence in the
record to support certain of the EPA regulatory enactments, and portions of the
regulations are plainly contrary to law. Thus, the effort by EPA has, in
certain respects, fallen far short of the mark set by the congressional mandate
found in section 6(e) of the Toxic Substances Control Act.
On remand, we trust that EPA will act with a sense of urgency to find
effective solutions to enforce the Act. We are not so naive as to assume or
suggest that hasty responses will ensure effective regulations. However, we
are well able to see, from the plain text of the Act, that the deadlines for
the enactment of regulations to enforce section 6(e) have passed. We therefore
believe that EPA should act with expedition to complete the important task
assigned to it by Congress.
So ordered.